

R&D Activities at IRID

International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning

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Outline of IRID

1. Name

International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)


2. Location of Main Office

5F 3Toyo Kaiji Building, 23-1 Nishi-shinbashi 2-chome, Minato-ku Tokyo 105-0003, Japan website: <u>http://www.irid.or.jp/en</u>

3. Membership (18)

 Research Institutes: Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
 Manufacturers, etc.: TOSHIBA Corporation, Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., ATOX Co., Ltd.
 Electric Utilities, etc.: Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc., Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc., Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc., The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc., Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., The Japan Atomic Power Company, Electric Power Development Co., Ltd., Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited





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Evaluation of Long Term Integrity of spent fuel (FY 2015-2016)

Decontamination/


Dose Reduction

Remotely Operated Decontamination Equipment (FY 2015)


Repair and Water Leakage Stoppage of PCV

Water Stoppage Technology of PCV (FY 2015) Full-Scale Test (FY 2015)

Investigation/Analysis in the Reactor



Debris Retrieval




Radioactive Waste Treatment/Disposal

Solid Waste Treatment and Disposal (FY 2015-2016)



Dose Rate Goals after decontamination

 Dose rate reduction goals to be achieved using the decontamination equipment (the necessity of PCV leakage investigation and repair work, and overall dose reduction scenario) 3 mSv/h for work area
 5 mSv/h for access route



* Mapping results of the dose rates at planned operation areas(with needs of dose reduction) derived from PCV investigation and repair project

3 mSv/h to10mSv/h

20 mSv/h to 50mSv/h


More than 50mSv/h

Out of study due to the lack of data


10 mSv/h to 20mSv/h

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Results and Future Plan of Decontamination Equipment Development




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


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Target Areas for Water Leakage Stoppage at PCV



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


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Assessing Conditions inside Reactor by Muon Observation Technology

Transmission Method


Scattering Method






Measurement by Transmission Method


- Detectors were installed at the north and north-west corners of Unit 1 reactor building (late January, 2015)
- Measured from February through May
- Detectors were shielded by 10 cm thick iron plates






Estimation of Fuel Debris Location Based on Comparison between

Design Image and Measurement




- Measured data, though it does not clearly indicate, shows that equipment, etc. are detected at locations where they are supposed to exist based on the design documents
- The boundaries of the PCV and the RPV in the image acquired from measurement matches those in the image drawn from design data.
- High density material (fuel debris) is not detected at the area where fuel assemblies are originally installed.





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Measurement by Scattering Method


- Detectors will be installed in front of the R/B and 2nd Floor in T/B (Operation Floor) at Unit 2
- Background radiation should be eliminated by shielding and algorism
- The detector in front of the R/B should be shielded by 8 cm thick iron plates
- The detector on the second floor of the T/B will not be shielded because of low background radiation







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
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Investigation inside the PCV (Unit 1)

[Investigated area] 1st^t floor grating outside the pedestal

[Steps for investigation and device development]

- (1) Investigation from X-100 penetration (FY 2015)
 - 1. Acquire information about the grating area on the 1st floor (access point to the basement, etc.): B1 (finished)
 - 2. Acquire images showing the outside of the pedestal on the basement floor (esp. access entrance and nearby vent tube) following the results of investigation at the torus room using a small boat in November 2013: B2 (planning)
- (2) Investigation from X-6 penetration (FY 2016-2017) (after decontamination around the X-6 penetration)
 - 1. Acquire further information about outside the pedestal on the basement floor by using fuel debris shape measurement apparatus: B3




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B1 Investigation Completed in April, 2015

(1) Overview of equipment

- Shape-changing crawler equipment
- Inserted from the narrow access entrance (X-100B penetration: φ100 mm)
- Travel on the grating stably.


(2) Image of investigation routes



Results of B1 Investigation


Investigated area	Results	
Access point to the basement	 For the next investigation (outside the pedestal on the basement), it is confirmed that there is an access point to the basement and no obstacles around it 	
CRD rail	 Could not reach to the CRD rail Could not recognize the CRD rail by evaluation of image-processed pictures, which were taken from the farthest reaching point by the investigation camera 	
En route of investigation	 No major damage was found inside the PCV equipment (HVH, PLR Line, pedestal wall, etc.) At every investigating point, temperature and dose rate were recorded. 	

<Access point to the basement>
















(Image at mock-up facility)

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Study of fuel debris retrieval method


We will study multiple method for fuel debris retrieval to meet different condition of damaged PCV and scattering fuel debris at each unit

Submersion method

Most favorable approach for minimizing the radioactive exposure of workers

Dry method (partial submersion, in-air work)


Development of technology which prevents scattering radioactive materials from PCV is needed to remove PCV contents in-air work



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Characteristics of Nuclear Waste Generated from Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident

Type of Waste	Characteristics	
Rubble/Felled and removed trees/soil, etc.	 Large quantity and widely distributed Poor experience with the treatment and disposal of felled and removed trees and soil Surface contamination by scattering/diffusion is main contamination and some contamination is penetrating contamination caused by accumulated water 	
Secondary waste by water treatment	 Poor experiences of treatment and disposal Difficult to collect the waste Partial estimation of quantity and kind of nuclide may be possible based on the characteristics of water treatment equipment 	
Fuel debris/Demolishing waste	 Large amount and high dose rate Difficult to sample actual waste due to low accessibility at present 	



Comparison between Wastes from Accident and Operation

Item of uncertainty	Waste from operation	Waste from accident
Generation of waste [quantity, type, period]	Ø	Δ
Handling (collecting/classifying) [difficulty]	Ø	Δ
Characterization [sufficiency of information, difficulty of sampling, representativeness of sample]	0	Δ
Technologies for processing and packaging waste	0	?~∆
Burial and disposal methods and safety assessment	∆~0	?
Regulations, technical standards, guidelines, siting	∆~0	?

 \odot : Fully understood or good prospect, O: Fair prospect, Δ : Limited ,

? : Cannot be discussed

Waste generated from operation has its own problem but is <u>fairly under control</u>.

• Information on basic properties of waste, including quantity at present, future change, activity and chemical substances contained in individual waste is identified.

• Both unprocessed and processed wastes are appropriately stored and managed in accordance with the current regulations.

• Regulations and standards, as well as disposal method and safety assessment method, have been in place.

 Many uncertainties poses important technical problems to disposal of the accident-generated waste at the Fukushima Daiichi. Solving these uncertainties and bringing the waste under control are the major goals of countermeasures and technology development.

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\sim Toward Fuel Debris Retrieval \sim

- Fuel debris retrieval at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is expected to be more difficult compared to that of the accident at the Three Mile Island 2 (TMI-2). It is necessary to put domestic and international wisdom together to develop the whole strategy, method and equipment for fuel debris retrieval.
- In order to complete the fuel debris retrieval, it is necessary to clarify the purpose and goal of relating each project, and then, to develop technologies flexibly by planning with an aim to achieve not partial but overall optimization.
- In making strategy, it is important to consider end-state (what you wish to achieve at the end), study various feasible options and always prepare alternative options.



Thank you for you attention

